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DENATURALIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Recently the United States brought proceedings
against a naturalized citizen, Frank Walus, to re-
voke his naturalization.' The government charged
that Walus had been a member of the Gestapo
during World War II and that he had committed
acts of brutality, including murder, which he con-
cealed from immigration and naturalization au-
thorities. At the conclusion of the bench trial, his
certificate of naturalization was canceled and his
citizenship was revoked.2
' United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill.
1978). After the conclusion of the trial, Walus moved for
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence that
allegedly exonerated him. This motion was denied, and
on appeal from that denial the Seventh Circuit reversed
the trial court's decision. United States v. Walus, Nos.
78-1732, 79-1140, 79-1587, and 79-1629 (7th Cir. Feb. 13,
1980). The case was remanded for a new trial. The
Seventh Circuit's opinion did not discuss the jury trial
issue, which is the subject of this recent trend.
28 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976) imposes a duty on United
States attorneys to institute such proceedings and also
gives jurisdiction. It reads in part:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys
for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing
good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any
court specified in subsection (a) of section 1421 of
this title in the judicial district in which the natu-
ralized citizen may reside at the time of bringing
suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside
the order admitting such person to citizenship....
Id. There are three grounds for revocation of citizenship:
(1) illegal procurement of the certificate of citizenship;
(2) procurement by concealment of a material fact; and
(3) procurement by willful misrepresentation. See id.
The government's case in Walus was in four counts.
These counts were grounded in the requirement of 8
U.S.C. § 1427 (1976) that, to be naturalized, a person
must have "good moral character." Counts I and II were
predicated on alleged acts of brutality and the conceal-
ment of them. Since the acts were alleged to be material
to the question of moral character, concealment of them
was procurement either by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation. Count III was pred-
icated on the alleged acts alone. The acts were alleged to
show bad moral character, making the procurement il-
legal. Count IV was predicated on the alleged conceal-
ment alone. The concealment was alleged to be evidence
of bad moral character, warranting revocation by itself,
or in the alternative, the concealment amounted to pro-
curement by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation.
Of course, if there had been no acts of brutality, there
would have been no concealment, so the court rightly
called the acts "the heart of this litigation." 453 F. Supp.
at 700. Walus' acts during the war were the "ultimate
facts" of the case, and the dramatic testimony of witnesses
There appears to be a striking similarity between
Walus' denaturalization proceeding and a criminal
prosecution. The ultimate facts to be proved were
Walus' war crimes; the government acted as pros-
ecutor and a serious penalty awaited the losing
defendant. This similarity raises the question of
whether the array of protections normally given a
criminal defendant should be given to a defendant
in a denaturalization proceeding. Currently, those
protections are not afforded. In a denaturalization
proceeding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply,3 the standard of proof is lower than that
which a prosecutor must meet in a criminal trial,4
the defendant cannot refuse to take the stand,5 and
he has no right to a jury.6
The question of the right to ajury in a denatur-
alization proceeding was first raised in 1908. 7 Al-
though the request for a jury was denied then, and
has been in every denaturalization proceeding
since, defendants have continued to request ajury.8
Courts have consistently treated the denaturaliza-
tion proceeding as a matter in equity which may
be tried without a jury. Although this is "settled
law," defendants and commentators have contin-
ued to make strong arguments that the proceeding
should not be treated as a matter in equity requir-
ing no jury.9
from three continents was directed to the question of
what Walus did during the war. The prosecution offered
testimony that Walus had been a member of the Gestapo
and had viciously beaten and murdered innocent citizens
of Czestochowa and Kielce, cities in Poland. The defense
offered testimony that Walus had been taken prisoner by
the German army and had been forced to work on farms
in Germany throughout the war.
3 See United States v.Jerome, 16 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
' See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118
(1943).
"See United States v. Matles, 247 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1957).
6 See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913); Johan-
nessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); United
States v. Mansour, 170 F. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
7 United States v. Mansour, 170 F. 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1908).
8 Walus requested a jury trial. 453 F. Supp. at 702.
9 See United States v. Matles, 247 F.2d at 381. See also,
e.g., W. VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF
ALIENS (1932) where the author states concerning depor-
tation:
This process should be judged in the light of the
charges upon which it is instituted, the facts which
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The request for a jury in any trial must be
grounded in either the sixth or the seventh amend-
ment, for these are the only sources of the right.
The sixth amendment grants the right to a jury in
criminal cases,10 and the seventh amendment
grants it in certain civil cases." In theory, a person
deciding whether a proceeding required a jury
would first consider whether it was criminal or
civil, and then, if it was civil, whether it was legal
or equitable. But historically, the first question to
come before the court was whether the proceeding
was legal or equitable.
The first reported denaturalization case in which
there was a demand for ajury trial was United States
v. Mansour12 in 1908. The government alleged that
Mansour had falsely sworn that he had resided in
the United States for the required length of time
before naturalization. The defendant requested a
jury trial. The court, noting that the act was silent
as to the method of trying the case, considered the
question from first principles. The court analogized
the proceeding to one arising on a bill to revoke a
patent, a proceeding historically heard in courts of
equity. The analogy was apt because in a denatur-
alization proceeding the government is attempting
to revoke a privilege which it granted in reliance
on the defendant's representations. Indeed, the
patent analogy has been relied upon and refined
by all subsequent cases dealing with the question.
It should be noted that unlike Walus, Mansour
did not resemble a criminal prosecution, because
an essential ingredient, the crime, was not present.
In Mansour then, the civil/criminal distinction was
not at issue; instead the legal/equitable distinction
was. The Mansour court was correct in steering the
denaturalization proceeding to the equitable side.
Faced with a new form of proceeding, created by
statute, the court did what every court does when
must be proved, the nature of the issues involved,
and above all, by its purposes and effects upon the
persons against whom it is brought. The study of
departmental records and judicial decisions makes
one analogy constantly recur, that of criminal pro-
ceedings. The courts have reiterated that the pro-
ceedings to expel are not criminal but administra-
tive. These words are mere labels.... The list of
causes for expulsion reads in part like a criminal
code ....Id. at 219.
"oThe sixth amendment reads, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to ... an impartial jury." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
" The seventh amendment reads, in pertinent part:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved.... "U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI.
'2"170 F. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
reasoning from stare decisis; it found the most
appropriate historical analogy. Mansour did not
pose the thorny problems that arose in later cases,
such as Walus, because the underlying facts did not
resemble a criminal case, and no one argued that
they did.
On rehearing a year later a question was raised
as to the correctness of the Mansour decision because
formal equity procedure had not been followed in
the trial. The court stated that in a denaturaliza-
tion proceeding there was no reason to follow
equity procedure formally "[n]or is it important to
try to assign the petition which the act of Congress
... provides for to the category either of a com-
plaint at common law or a bill in equity. In form
it is neither, being exactly what the act calls for, a
petition.... This conclusion to the Mansour case
and the accompanying comment by the court dem-
onstrate that Mansour did not finally settle the
question. Nevertheless, the case had set the tone for
all future cases with its compelling analogy to the
patent revocation.
InJohannessen v. United States'4 the Supreme Court
eliminated the ambiguity created by Mansour. Like
Mansour, Johannessen was alleged to have ob-
tained his naturalization by falsely swearing that
he had complied with the residency requirements.
Johannessen did not request a jury. The precise
question faced by the Court was whether Congress
could authorize by statute a direct attack on the
judgment of a court admitting an alien to citizen-
ship. But the jury question was nevertheless settled
by the Court's careful and deliberate denomination
of the proceeding as one in equity. Again the
proceeding was analogized to a revocation of a
patent or other public grant that was obtained by
fraud. Since there was no doubt that patents and
other public grants of privilege could be revoked
in actions in equity,1 5 the Court had no trouble,
once it had made the analogical leap, in holding
that certificates of naturalization could be revoked
in the same way. Thus it was settled by the Court
that the matter was a proceeding in equity.
13 Id. at 676.
14 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
"The court inJohannessen stated:
"It may now be accepted as settled that the United
States can properly proceed by bill in equity to have
a judicial decree of nullity and an order of cancel-
lation of a patent issued in mistake or obtained by
fraud, where the Government has a direct interest,
or is under an obligation respecting the relief in-
voked."
225 U.S. at 239 (quoting United States v. Beebe, 127
U.S. 338, 342 (1887)).
While both Mansour andJohannessen held that the
denaturalization proceeding was like a revocation
of a patent, Mansour held only that this similarity
made the proceeding like an equity proceeding,
whereas Johannessen held that the proceeding was
an equity proceeding.
Both Mansour andJohannessen involved violations
of residency requirements. In such cases the anal-
ogy between the revocation of a patent and the
revocation of naturalization is easier to grasp than
in a case such as Walus where the revocation is
sought because of the defendant's past criminal
acts. 6 Granted that concealment or fraud is in-
volved in both types of cases, the type of fact
concealed in Mansour and Johannessen is a morally
neutral fact. It loses its neutrality only on applica-
tion for citizenship. War crimes are not morally
neutral. In contrast to residency cases, the wicked-
ness of the concealment pales before the wickedness
of the fact concealed. It is Walus' alleged atrocities
that inspire moral indignation, and it was for those
atrocities that his American citizenship was re-
voked.
The denaturalization statute itself appears to
recognize the distinction between acts and con-
cealment. The statute states generally that an ap-
plicant for citizenship must be a person of good
moral character and that conduct at any time of
his life may be taken into consideration in deter-
mining whether his character is good. 17 In a sepa-
16 This free denomination of the atrocities alleged to
have been committed by Walus as criminal acts may
seem to beg the question. It does not take account of the
intricate questions of (1) whether the acts were techni-
cally "crimes" in the jurisdiction where they were com-
mitted, the German Reich, and (2) if they were not,
whether it is fair to say that Walus's citizenship was
revoked for past crimes. Yet in light of the atrocious
nature of the acts alleged, it seems skittish to shy away
from the word "crimes." Such acts are often called "war
crimes" and it would be fair to label them mala in se.
Such acts were labeled crimes by the International Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg and, as one author wrote "to state
the German lawyers' proposition [that the mass unjusti-
fied killings were not murder since no statute forbade
them] is to demonstrate its melange of impudence, cyni-
cism, and absurdity." Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and
Aggressive War, 59 HARv. L. REV. 396, 440 (1946).
178 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3), (e) (1976) states in part:
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such peti-
tioner... (3) during all the period referred to in this
subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character....
(e) In determining whether the petitioner has sus-
tained the burden of establishing good moral char-
acter ... the court shall not be limited to the
rate section it states that no person shall be re-
garded as having good moral character if he gives
false testimony for the purpose of obtaining citizen-
ship.
s
In 1913 the Supreme Court first considered a
request for ajury in a denaturalization proceeding.
In Luria v. United States'9 that request was denied
on the ground that the proceeding was in equity.
The Court refined the patent analogy by speaking
in more abstract terms than had prior lower courts.
"The right asserted and the remedy sought ...
[are] essentially equitable, not legal .... 20 In its
discussion of the legal/equitable distinction, the
Luria Court quoted Parsons v. Bedford,2 ' an 1830 case
interpreting the seventh amendment. In Parsons the
Court had said:
By common law, they [the Framers] meant what the
constitution denominated in the third article "law;"
not merely suits, which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and deter-
mined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered .... 22
The Parsons Court thus urged that the substance
of the proceeding be dispositive of the question,
not merely the ancient category to which it may
have belonged when circumstances were different.
What seemed appropriate in Luria, another resi-
dency case, therefore may not be appropriate in a
war crimes case.
In 1943, in Schneiderman v. United States,23 the
Supreme Court retreated slightly from its insistence
that denaturalization was a simple equity proceed-
ing and introduced a new standard of proof in
denaturalization proceedings. The case against the
defendant must be clear and convincing so as not
to leave the issue in doubt.2' This rigorous standard
was introduced because the Court recognized that
petitioner's conduct during the five years preceding
the filing of the petition, but may take into consid-
eration as a basis for such determination the peti-
tioner's conduct and acts at any time prior to that
period.
i8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(6) (1976) states in part: "No
person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of
good moral character who ... has given false testimony
for the purpose of obtaining... [citizenship]."
i9 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
20Id. at 27-28.
2i 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
2 Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
23320 U.S. 118 (1943).
2Id. at 125, 158.
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denaturalization "is more serious than a taking of
one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other
penalty.... [Citizenship] once conferred should
not be taken away without the clearest sort of
justification and proof. ' 's
After Schneiderman other cases also recognized the
uniqueness of proceedings granting and revoking
citizenship. One such case was United States v. Strom-
berg.26 The issue in Stromberg was unusual. While
the denaturalization proceeding was pending, Con-
gress eliminated, as a ground for denaturalization,
the ground on which the government had brought
the action against Stromberg. The government
amended its complaint to conform to the new
statute, but the court refused to allow the amend-
ment to relate back under rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that "[i]t is ques-
tionable whether the doctrine of 'relation back'
should be applied with the same liberality when it
will deprive a party against whom the amendment
is made of a substantial right, ... as when its
purpose is simply to lift the bar of the statute of
limitations." 27 The court then quoted Schneiderman:
"'A denaturalization suit is not a criminal proceed-
ing. But neither is it an ordinary civil action since
it involves an important adjudication of status. ' ' 2s
These words are reminiscent of the Mansour court's
struggle nearly fifty years earlier to place the pro-
ceeding somewhere between an action at law and
a bill in equity.
It should be noted that Schneiderman and Stromberg
were not residency cases. Each involved something
more serious. The government proceeded against
Schneiderman because he had been a member of
the Communist Party and against Stromberg be-
cause he had been engaged in an unlawful occu-
pation, bookmaking. It is reasonable to suppose
that it was these underlying facts, giving a criminal
tinge to the cases, that made these courts hesitant
to say that the matter should be treated simply as
equitable, but if that was the case, the opinions do
' Id. at 122. The following suggestive language is in a
denaturalization case decided shortly after Schneiderman.
This is neither a criminal, quasicriminal or civil
action, but, on the contrary, is an action in equity.
The court is of the belief that the defendant is
entitled to that rule of law which requires that a
man shall be proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt before he should be so found.
United States v. Wezel, 49 F. Supp. 16, 17 (S.D. Ill.
1943).
26 227 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1955).
2TId. at 906.
2 Id. (quoting United States v. Schneiderman, 320
U.S. at 160).
not acknowledge it. They only speak in terms of
the importance of the privilege which will be taken
away if the government wins.
In United States v. Matles2 one court of appeals
squarely faced the question whether denaturaliza-
tion proceedings might in some circumstances be
criminal in nature. In this case the defendant
desired not to take the stand. If the action were
criminal, there would be no question that he could
refuse to do so. The court however found that the
denaturalization proceedings were not sufficiently
criminal to permit assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege. The court gave three reasons for its find-
ing: first, denaturalization proceedings had been
labeled civil for slightly different purposes in other
cases; 30 second, the proceedings are based on a
theory of recission of a status obtained by fraud;
3t
and third, little prejudice attaches to a defendant's
refusal to answer specific questions once he takes
the stand, since such refusal would be before a
judge, not a jury.
The judge who wrote the Matles opinion dis-
closed that he had significant reservations about
all three rationales. First, this type of case had been
distinguished from ordinary civil actions;3 second,
"the issues [involved were] ... close to those in-
volved in a prosecution"' ' under the Smith Actss
or the Internal Security Act; 36 and third, "one who
takes the stand must play a dangerous game of
properly timing his claims of privilege to avoid
both contempt and waiver."
37
Nevertheless, as one of the concurring opinions
in Matles points out, there is a specific danger that
the right not to take the stand is designed to guard
against: it is the prejudice that might be engen-
dered in the jury when and if the defendant refuses
to answer certain questions as he is privileged to
do under the fifth amendment. 38 Where there is no
2 247 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1957).
'3Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Schneiderman,
320 U.S. at 160).
3' 247 F.2d at 381 (citing Luria v. United States, 231
U.S. at 27-28).
3 247 F.2d at 381 (citing 8 WiGMORE ON EviDENCE §
2268 (3d ed. 1940)). The first two reasons overlap sub-
stantially because it was on the recission theory that the
cases cited in rationale number one relied. Yet they are
not identical because one relied on the theory itself while
the other relied on the unequivocal assertion that the
matter was civil.
3 247 F.2d at 381.
3 Id.
1 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976).
6 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-858 (1976).
3 247 F.2d at 382.
1 Id. at 382-83 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
jury, a right not to take the stand at all seems
superfluous. Thus it would seem that a defendant
in a denaturalization proceeding should ask for
both, the jury and the right not to take the stand,
or neither.
Thus, with such minor concessions as Schneider-
man and Stromberg, the courts have consistently
resisted the attempts of defendants in denaturali-
zation proceedings to avoid the rigors of an equi-
table proceeding. There are hints throughout the
case law that there are as many as three distinct
rationales tipping the scales in favor of treating the
proceeding as one in equity.
The first may be the lack of a certain nexus
between trial and punishment. In Walus, for ex-
ample, the court said: "[Cl]ivil proceedings are not
... considered criminal matters simply because
certain allegations, if proven, would support a
criminal indictment. A denaturalization proceed-
ing is [an action] ... to consider only whether the
defendant's Certificate of Naturalization should be
revoked and his citizenship canceled." 39 This com-
ment underscores the fact that there is no certainty
that denaturalization will be followed by deporta-
tion. And there is no way to predict what the effect
of deportation on the deportee will be, even if
deportation does take place. Luria, for example,
had resided in South Africa for quite some time
before he was denaturalized. It is absurd to call his
loss of American citizenship a punishment, even if
it may seem to be such in the abstract.40 In contrast,
no one is indifferent to the loss of money or liberty
that follows a criminal conviction. Nor are most
people indifferent to the unquantifiable but very
real disgrace that follows a criminal conviction.
The hard fact of a criminal conviction is that real
punishment follows. Where that hard fact is lack-
ing, as in a denaturalization proceeding, the simi-
larity between the two is considerably weakened.
3 United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 703 (em-
phasis added).
'°Justice Brandeis wrote that deportation may mean
the "loss of both property and life; or all that makes life
worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922). The case of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960), gives a rare glimpse at one kind of loss that may
follow deportation. Nestor was deported for being a
member of the Communist Party after living in the
United States for 42 years. His social security benefits,
for which he had become eligible one year before depor-
tation, were terminated. However, in spite of the lan-
guage of Justice Brandeis and the facts of Flemming, there
is no certainty in any case that deportation will result in
any legally cognizable loss to the deportee.
Matles gives a clue to another rationale for treat-
ing the proceeding as equitable. Where one crimi-
nal protection, such as a jury, is afforded the
defendant, all such protections may then become
necessary if they are viewed as interdependent.
Matles pointed out how denaturalization proceed-
ings would be burdened if all the safeguards of
criminal trials were instituted.
Finally, the rescission theory itself may indicate
a third rationale, one having to do with burdens
on the respective parties in a denaturalization pro-
ceeding. The Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States4' pointed out:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to for-
bid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.
4 2
In other words, the United States may make the
obstacles to naturalization as high as it wishes. Yet
the obstacles to naturalization are not high. The
requirements for naturalization, as set forth in the
statute, are simple, easy to understand, not oppres-
sive and even generous to the applicant.43 There is
a certain appropriate parallelism in the denatur-
alization proceeding. Since the government has not
chosen to place great obstacles before an alien
seeking citizenship, the courts have not seen fit to
place great obstacles before the government revok-
ing it.
Fairness to all the parties is the essence of an
equitable proceeding. The government has unlim-
ited power to keep aliens out, which it chooses not
to exercise fully. In light of this fact, and the other
rationales mentioned, the courts have chosen fairly
and appropriately to avoid equating denaturali-
zation proceedings with criminal proceedings, how-
ever much the unusual facts of a case like Walus
make them appear similar on the surface.
41 142 U.S. 651 (1892).42 Id. at 659.
43 For example, even persons who have lost their U.S.
citizenship and persons who are citizens of enemy coun-
tries are not precluded from naturalization. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1435(a) and § 1442(a) (1976). The basic requirements
for naturalization are: a person must (1) reside in the
U.S. for five years; (2) the five years must be immediately
preceding the admission to citizenship; and (3) he must
be a person of good moral character. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(1976). The person must have a knowledge of the English
language and of the history and government of the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976).
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